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Abstract
The central question this paper seeks to answer is how mone-
tary policy might a¤ect the equilibrium behaviour of default and
sovereign risk premium. The paper is based on one-interest-
ratemodel. Public debt becomes risky due to an active scal
policy, as in Uribe (2006), reecting the scal authoritys lim-
ited ability to control primary surplus. The insolvency problem
is due to a string of bad luck (negative shocks a¤ecting primary
surplus). But in contrast to Uribes results, as the sovereign debt
cost increases (which result from weak primary surplus), default
becomes anticipated and reected by a rising country risk pre-
mium and default probability. The default is dened as reneging
on a contractual agreement and so the decision is set by the s-
cal authority. However, conicting objectives between scal and
monetary authority play an important role in leading scal au-
thority to default on its liabilities. The characteristic of the gov-
ernment policy needed to restore the equilibrium after the default
is also analyzed.
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1 Introduction
Interactions between scal and monetary policy in the determination
of the price level have been the object of a great debate in monetary
theory for years. Sargent and Wallace (1975) argue that if the mone-
tary authorities adopt a policy rule for the interest rate (rather than
the money stock) the equlibrium outcome leads to price level indeter-
minacy. However, the Sargent and Wallace result is not entirely general.
McCallum (1981) rstly accounts for the following well-known result in
the literature. Monetary policy feedback rules, linking the nominal in-
terest rate to endogenous variables such as the price level, permit to
rule out the classical problem of price level indeterminacy advocated by
Sargent and Wallace. Following Taylors (1993) stimulating article, the
so-called Taylor ruleshave received growing attention in recent years.
According to this type of rule, the central banks interest rate target is
set as an increasing function of the ination rate and the output gap.1
In order to rule out multiple equilibria, theoretical studies2 suggest that
the monetary authority has to respond to increases in ination with a
more than one-to-one increase in the nominal interest rate. In term of
Leeper (1991), this monetary policy rule is known as activeotherwise,
it is called passive.
However, this literature does not account for the scal policy behav-
ior. It means that the Ricardian equivalenceproposition applies; then,
a comprehensive study of the implications of government decits (and
public debt) over the link between interest rate rules and price stability
is not possible. All the same, there are important implications to con-
sider within the relation between monetary and scal policies. In the
recent macroeconomic debate, it is argued that the lack of a sound scal
policy undermine the objective of price stability.3
The seminal contribution of Leeper (1991) made also an important
distinction between activeand passivescal policy. It denes a scal
policy as activewhen taxes respond only weakly to public debt levels
and passiveones when taxes respond strongly to debt levels.4 In a stan-
dard model the research showed that two combinations, either (i) active
1See, among others, Clarida et al., 1998, 2000, that provide empirical evidence to
the view that Taylor-type rules consistently describe the behavior of several central
banks.
2See for instance, Taylor 1999 and Woodford 2003.
3The Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact in the European Union
which set quantitative limits on scal decits and public debt for the Member States
is based on this argument.
4Later on, Woodford (1995) will identify this type of policies as a non-Ricardian
and Ricardian scal policy.
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monetary and passive scal policy or (ii) active scal and passive mone-
tary policy, yield determinacy, a unique stationary rational expectations
equilibrium. In case (i) the usual monetarist view that ination depends
only on monetary policy is conrmed. However, case (ii) is scalist in
the sense that scal policy, in addition to monetary policy, has an e¤ect
on the ination rate. Leeper (1991) also showed that the steady state
is indeterminate, with multiple stationary solutions, when both policies
are passive, while the economy is explosive when both policies are active.
Thus, the so-called Fiscal Theory of the Price Level(FTPL), has
emerged.5 This well-known theoretical framework enables to capture the
e¤ects of scal policy on the dynamic behavior of nominal variables, like
price level.
The FTPL asserts that scal variables can fully determine the price
level independently of monetary variables. More specicaly, when s-
cal solvency is not ensured for each sequence of the price level, scal
variables uniquely determine the equilibrium level of nominal variables.
This extreme result is the polar opposite of the monetarist statement
that the price level and the ination rate depend primarily on monetary
variables. Not surprisingly, the Fiscal Theory approach has triggered
criticism and controversy.6
Controversy concerns the nature of the intertemporal budget con-
straint of the government. In di¤erent papers Buiter argues that FTPL
confuses the roles of budget constraints and equilibrium conditions in
models of a market economy. But more interesting, Buiter (2002) criti-
cizes FTPL as a theory of price level determination because it explicitly
rules out default. Equilibrium price-level changes each period in response
to the (stochastic) scal shocks. And with price level changes in each
period providing the capital gains and losses on public debt level neces-
sary for equilibrium, default is never necessary. Once the possibility of
explicit default is properly allowed for, non-Ricardian regimes become
Ricardian regimes and the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level vanishes.
Buiter shows that under a non-Ricardian scal-monetary programme
with an exogenous nominal interest rate rule, the equilibrium conditions
are the same as under the Ricardian scal-monetary programme without
contract fullment and with an exogenous nominal interest rate rule.
Uribe (2006) presents a dynamic FTPL model of default in which
he allows limited ination rate exibility. When a shock is so large
that limited ination rate exibility cannot provide the necessary capital
5The main contributors are Woodford, 1994, 1995, 2001, Sims, 1994 and Cochrane,
1999.
6It has been mainly questioned by Buiter (1999, 2001 and 2002) as well as Mc-
Callum (2001) and Niepelt (2004).
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gain or loss on government debt, then the government either devalues
or revalues its debt. Default is a reduction in debt below its contractual
value. This is an interesting application of the FTPL to the problem of
default, but it neither exhibits an increasing probability of default nor a
positive expected default rate as empirical evidence suggests.
The main objective of this paper is to analyse the price stability and
sovereign default risk issue. The model is grounded on a micro-founded
equilibrium model with innitely lived private agents that allow devi-
ations from the Ricardian equivalence. This framework is particularly
suitable to study the interactions between monetary and scal policy
and its e¤ect over both price stability and sovereign risk premium. It is
shown that active interest rate rules, overreacting to ination, are nei-
ther necessary nor su¢ cient to guarantee a unique stable solution for
the price level without defaulting. Furthermore, in some cases, even
passive interest rate rules might drive the economy to an unsustain-
able path without defaulting. This results suggest that monetary policy
matters being able to worsen a given scenario. Then, sovereign default
is required to restore scal solvency and price stability. But the de-
fault rate must be high enough to ensure the economy to reach a stable
equilibrium in the post-default dynamics.
The rest of the paper is organized in seven sections. Section II
presents the model. Section III describes the three possible scenarios
for this economy and section IV, the ination and default dynamics.
Section V explicitly calculates the expected recovery rate and sovereing
risk premium. Section VI provides further reseach showing how detailed
specications of the monetary rule a¤ect the equilibrium dynamics. Fi-
nally, in Section VII, the conclusion.
2 The Model
2.1 The Households
Consider a closed economy inhabited by a large number of identical
innitely-lived households. Preferences are described by,
U0 = E0
1X
t=0
tu (ct) (1)
where ct denotes households consumption level of a perishable good in
period t, u () is the single-period utility function assumed to be increas-
ing, strictly concave and continuously di¤erentiable,  2 (0; 1) denotes
the subjective discount factor and E is the mathematical expectation
operator conditional on period  :
Each period, households are assumed to have access to a one-period
4
nominal government bond, denoted Bt. This bond o¤ers, in period t+1;
a contractual gross nominal interest rate Rt: However, the scal author-
ity may default on its debt and in each period it repays a fraction ht
of its liabilities. Therefore, household investment in sovereign bonds in
period t is given by Bt whereas the earnings from the last-period invest-
ment is expressed as htRt 1Bt 1. This expression is called the recovery
value of the sovereign debt whereas ht 2 (0; 1) represents the recovery
rate.
In our notation, Buiter (1999, 2001 and 2002) do not restrain ht as-
suming that both ht < 0 and ht > 1 are possible options. The former
assumption ht < 0 implies that the sovereign can be a net creditor.
This seems unrealistic particularly, in developing countries and not so
relevant in a model focused to analyse scenarios of sovereign debt cri-
sis and default. The last assumption ht > 1 also adopted by Uribe
(2006), implies that any surplus resources over the contractual value of
the outstanding debt are shared out equally among the holders of the
contractual government debt. However, this excess of resources shoul
not be interpreted as a government subsidy because in general they are
allocated to tax payers; not to bondholders. Buiter names these trans-
fers super-solvency premium. But even more important, government
bonds are xed-income securities as opposite to any other variable re-
turn security, such as stocks. In a more realistic approach we propose
constraint ht as ht(0; 1).
Besides, in each period t households have also the opportunity to
invest in a complete set of nominal state-contingent assets. The total
investment, in nominal terms, can be expressed as EtQt;t+1Dt+1 where
Qt;t+1 denotes the stochastic nominal discount factor of an asset with a
random nominal payment Dt+1. The time t revenue from the investment
made in the previous period, is denoted as Dt:
Finally, households are endowed with a constant and exogenous amount
of perishable goods denoted by y and they pay real lump-sum taxes  t:
Their ow budget constraint can be written as,
Ptct +Bt + EtQt;t+1Dt+1  Pt (y    t) + htRt 1Bt 1 +Dt (2)
where Pt denotes the price level in period t.
Then, the household is subject to an appropriate set of borrowing
limits which prevents "Ponzi Games". In the absence of nancial market
frictions, the borrowing constraint takes the form:
ht+1RtBt +Dt+1   Et+1
1X
j=t+1
Qt+1;jPj (y    j) 8t+ 1 (3)
where Qt+1;j = Qt+1;t+2Qt+2;t+3   Qj 1;j and Qt+1;t+1 = 1:
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The representative household maximizes its lifetime utility (1) sub-
ject to its ow budget constraint (2) and to its borrowing limits (3) by
choosing fct; Bt; Dt+1g1t=0 taking as given the set of processes fPt;  t; Qt;t+1; htRt 1g1t=0
and the initial values D0 and B 1. In addition to equation (2) holding
with equality, the rst order conditions are given by,
ct : uc (ct) = t (4a)
Dt+1 : Qt;t+1 = 
t+1Pt
tPt+1
(4b)
Bt : R
 1
t = Etht+1
t+1Pt
tPt+1
(4c)
where t denotes the Lagrangian multiplier in period t.
Equation (4a) states that the marginal utility of consumption must
equal the marginal utility of wealth, t, for all time t. Equation (4b)
represents the standard pricing equation for each one-period forward
nominal contingent asset and equation (4c) represents the pricing equa-
tion for the case of the risky sovereign bonds between period t and t+1.
The transversality condition for the nancial assets is written:
lim
T!1
EtQt;T [hTRT 1BT 1 +DT ] = 0 (4d)
2.2 The Monetary and Fiscal Authorities
The scal authority levies lump-sum taxes, Pt t; which are assumed to
follow an exogenous, stochastic process. Recalling that scal authority
issues nominal bonds, Bt; with a contractual gross nominal interest rate,
Rt; but may default on its outstanding debt and repays a fraction ht of
its liabilities Rt 1Bt 1; the sequential budget constraint7 is given by,
Bt = htRt 1Bt 1   Pt t (5)
where Bt 1Rt 1 is given in period t and the recovery rate satises ht 2
(0; 1).
2.2.1 The Monetary Rule
Following Uribe (2006), we suppose that the monetary policy takes the
form of an interest-rate feedback rule whereby the short-term nominal
interest rate is set as a function of ination. But while Uribe uses a
simple linear Taylor rule, active in the sense of Leeper (1991), and with
an explicit ination targeting objective. We wish to consider a slightly
7For sake of simplicity, in this paper, we ignore money and seigniorage revenues.
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di¤erent, asymmetric, monetary regime. The central bank behavior can
be expressed as,
Rt =  (t) =

R if t  ^
R +  (t   ^) otherwise with  >  1
(6)
where R =  1 is the stationary value of the gross nominal interest
rate associated to the ination target ; and ^ represents an ination
threshold. It will be useful to dene: R^ =  1^; about which we make
the following assumption:
Assumption 1: R^ > R; or, equivalently: ^ > :
The monetary rule (6) implies that if current ination increases be-
yond the ination threshold ^; the central bank reacts actively8:  >
 1. Otherwise, the central bank pegs9 the current interest rate to its
target R which is associated to an ination target  lower than ^: Note
that central bank is more concerned about tackling high ination levels
than dealing with scenarios dominated by low ination and by deation.
In most developing countries, high ination is a relatively frequent phe-
nomena whereas deation is quite rare and not so deep. Stylized facts
on ination rates in these countries shape an asymmetric behavior. So it
seems to be reasonable to suppose an asymmetric behavior of the central
bank. This monetary policy can be called "monitoring policy of current
ination".
In developed countries, much debate has been devoted to the suitabil-
ity of the Taylor rule in characterizing the behaviour of central banks,
especially in abnormal times. Rabanal (2004), for instance, presents ev-
idence that Taylor rule coe¢ cients changed signicantly both with time
and economic conditions in the United State between 1960 and 2003
using quarterly data. The qualitative interpretation is that the US Fed-
eral Reserve places much more weight on ination stabilization during
expansion periods, while it shifts its focus to output stabilization when
in recessions. Analogous reasoning applies to the monetary rule (6). In
developing countries, Brazil constitutes a successful example of ination
targeting. After being forced to abandon the crawling peg to the US
dollar, Brazil adopted an ination targeting regime in July 1999 which
brought annual ination down to one-digit gures in less than three
years.
8This condition is identical to that which led Leeper to describe the monetary
rule as "active".
9Actually, as demonstrated by Uribe (2006), a forward-looking rule of type: Rt =
R+ 
 
1=(Et
 1
t+1)  

will lead to the same results as our simpler pegging rule.
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2.2.2 The Debt Recovery Rule
Given that the scal authority does not control the primary surplus, it
is useful to suppose the existence of a rule H() which species how the
scal authority chooses the recovery rate ht:We will suppose that such a
rule is a (non increasing) function of the nominal interest rate, denoted
Rndt ; to be determined by the monetary authority in the No-Default
case. Then, Rndt = 
 
ndt

represents the potential cost of honoring the
whole debt in the future. More precisely, the scal authoritys behavior
is supposed to be dened by:
ht = H(R
nd
t ) =
(
1 if Rndt <
=
R
h(Rndt ) < 1 otherwise
(7)
where the threshold
=
R denotes the maximum nominal interest rate that
the scal authority will accept on its new issued debt without default-
ing on its current liability. Finally, h(Rndt ) denotes the fraction of the
sovereign debt honored by the scal authority in case of default as a
decreasing function of Rndt ; function which will be specied later on.
Assumption 2:
=
R > R^:
This assumption implies that the scal authority is more tolerant
 said, lax  than its monetary counterpart in terms of equilibrium
ination and interest rates.
However, it is important to point out that the main objective of the
central bank is to monitor ination whereas the scal authority only
cares about the cost of its debt. Then, note that in order to control
current ination the central bank uses the current interest rate a¤ect-
ing, in this way, the cost of the sovereign debt. Consequently, a conict
of interests between both authorities may arise dening the equilibrium
outcome. For instance, an aggressive central bank ghting against ina-
tion may trigger the sovereign default as well as a¤ect its size.
2.3 Market Clearing
At equilibrium, the goods market must clear: ct = y; meaning that the
consumption level is constant along time t. Thus, from equation (4a)
it turns out that the marginal utility of consumption, t, is also con-
stant. Equation (4b) becomes Qt;t+1 = Pt=Pt+1. Applying conditional
expectations operator Et to the last expression, we obtain EtQt;t+1 =
Et (1=t+1) where t+1 = Pt+1=Pt is the the gross rate of ination and
EtQt;t+1 denotes the nominal price of a risk-free portfolio which pays one
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unit of currency in all states of the nature. Consequently, the risk-free
interest rate can be expressed as,
Rft = 
 1

Et
1
t+1
 1
(8)
Using the constancy of t, equation (4c) becomes,
Rt = 
 1

Et
ht+1
t+1
 1
(9)
Finally, given that all households are assumed to be identical, at equi-
librium, there is no borrowing or lending among them, i.e. Dt = 0 8t:
Thus all the assets held by private agents are in the form of government
debt. Using this result and, again, Qt;t+1 = Pt=Pt+1, the transversality
condition can be rewritten (in real terms):
lim
T!1
Et
T t

hTRT 1bT 1
T

= 0 (10)
where bt = Bt=Pt:
The sovereign debt dynamics, described by equation (5), can also be
written in real terms as:
bt = htRt 1bt 1=t    t (11)
Therefore, the equilibrium can be dened as follows:
Denition 1 A rational expectations competitive equilibrium is dened
as a set of processes
n
t; bt; Rt; R
f
t ; ht
o1
t=0
satisfying equations (8), (9),
(10), (11), the monetary rules (6), the debt recovery rule (7), and the
exogenous process for the primary surpluses f tg1t=0 where R 1b 1 are
given and the recovery rate satises ht 2 (0; 1) q
Using equations (9), (10), (11), and some algebra  see Appendix
we obtain:
htRt 1bt 1=t =
1X
h=0
hEt t+h = Tt 8t (12)
where Tt is the discounted value of present and future primary surpluses.
Note that scal surpluses are discounted by the gross real risk-free in-
terest rate given by  1 see equation (8).
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Under this form, (12) is the key equation of the debate between
the advocates10 of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level determination
(FTPL) and its detractors11. If the scal authority is committed to
honour the whole of its liabilities and so ht = 1 then the current
ination rate, t, becomes determined according to the FTLP. This is
because Tt is exogenous and Rt 1bt 1 is predetermined in period t. On
the contrary, if ht is allowed to be less than unity, then the current value
of Tt may a¤ect both current ination and recovery rate. This may lead
to the Buiters conclusion that any path for ht and t satisfying equation
(12) could be considered as an equilibrium outcome.
Using (12) to eliminate htRt 1bt 1=t from equation (11) we get:
bt=Tt    t
= EtTt+1 8t  0 (13)
The real equilibrium value of the public debt is necessarily equal to
the present value of future discounted real scal surpluses. Now, when
t > 0 replaces bt 1 by this equilibrium value in t  1 into equation (12)
we obtain:
t
ht
=
Rt 1
1 + t
8t > 0 (14)
where
t =
Tt   Et 1Tt
Et 1Tt
is the innovation in percentage points on the present discounted value
of primary surpluses. Thus, t > 0 if the discounted value of present
and future primary surpluses is higher than the value expected for this
variable in period t   1. Otherwise, t becomes either negative or null
and void.
Equation (14) can receive the same interpretation than equation
(12).12 Particularly, one may conclude, as Buiter (1999, 2001), that
any path for ht and t satisfying equation (14) could be considered as
an equilibrium outcome. But this is not the case because equation (14)
is not the only equilibrium restriction to be satised by both t and ht.
The monetary rule (6) and, especially, the debt recovery rule (7) also
a¤ect the equilibrium outcome. Thus, the objective of the next section
is to analyze the extent to which each of these variables may react after a
shock to Tt: Note however that, whatever the monetary and the recovery
rules, the ratio t=ht is uniquely determined by equation (14).
10See Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), Woodford (1994, 1995) and Cochrane (1999),
among others.
11Buiter (1999, 2001, 2002) for instance.
12In period t = 0; equation (14) becomes 0=h0 = R 1=1 + 0 where 0 =
(T0   E 1T0) =E 1T0.
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3 Three Scenarios for One Economy
The asymmetric form of both equations (6) and (7) may potentially
imply the existence of four regimes, but assumptions 1 and 2 permit to
exclude the case where the central bank naturally13 pegs the interest
rate to R; leading the scal authority to default on its outstanding debt.
Indeed, this scenario would require Rndt = R >
=
R which violates the
condition R < R^ <
=
R: Three scenarios are left.
The two rst scenarios correspond to the No-Default case where
ht = 1 satisfying Rndt 
=
R: Under these scenarios the scal authority
considers that the potential cost of servicing the whole debt is a¤ordable
and so it honors its entire liabilities. The rst scenario is characterized by
a relatively low current ination say, t  ^ and so the central bank
behaves passively by pegging current interest rates to the level R. This
type of periods are usually called "Tranquil Times". The second sce-
nario is characterized by a relatively high current ination say, t > ^
where the central bank behaves actively by increasing current inter-
est rates. This scenario corresponds to "Ination Times" described by
Loyo (1999). The third one is the scenario of Sovereign Default where
ht = h
d(Rndt ) < 1 satisfying R
nd
t >
=
R: In this case, the scal authority
nds that the potential cost of servicing its whole debt is una¤ordable.
Consequently, it defaults on its liabilities by honoring only a fraction of
its nancial obligations.
Both "Tranquil Times" and "Ination Times" are characterized by
the absence of sovereign default. Then, the equilibrium level of ination
and interest rates are given by equations (14) and (6) with ht = 1 :
ndt =
Rt 1
1 + t
(15a)
Rndt =
 
ndt

=

R if ndt  ^
R + 
 
ndt   ^

otherwise
(15b)
Equation (15a) expresses that current ination is determined by the
current scal shock, as predicted by the Fiscal Theory of Price Level
(FTPL). And equation (15b) expresses that in both No-Default sce-
narios, the current nominal interest rate is determined by the current
ination level.
3.1 "Tranquil Times"
When the value of the ination rate (15a) satises the condition ndt  ^;
13By "naturally", we mean: "considering the ination rate which would be realized
in the case of No Default".
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equation (15b) implies that the central bank pegs the interest rate to R:
So, these periods are characterized by both low current ination and
interest rates. We have:
Tt =
Rt 1
1 + t
 ^ (16a)
RTt = R (16b)
where Tt denotes current ination rate during Tranquil Times and R
T
t
denotes the risky gross nominal interest rate paid by the scal authority
during Tranquil Times.
Time-t equilibrium is determined as the FTPL determination asserts
(See Woodford 1995). The central bank pegs the nominal interest rate
to its target and the equilibrium price level is that level that makes the
real value of nominally denominated government liabilities equal to the
present value of the expected future government budget surpluses.
Both equations (16a) and (16b) are satised on condition that Tt  ^
which implies:
Rt 1  (1 + t) R^ (17a)
remembering that R^ =  1^ ; or, equivalently:
t  ^ (Rt 1) (17b)
where ^ (R) is dened as:
^ (R)  R=R^  1 (18)
Note that, if this scenario applies in period t  1; we have Rt 1 = R
and the condition (17b) can be simplied as: t  ^
 
R

with ^
 
R

<
0: In this case, Tranquil Times are driven by either positive or not so
negative scal shocks. It is worth noticing that the negative scal shocks
must be rather soft. In the case where Rt 1 veries Rt 1 > R; and
especially when Rt 1 > R^; a positive scal shock may be necessary to
restore a period of "Tranquil Times".
The deterministic steady state associated to (16a)-(16b) is given by:
T =  R   and RT = R: Of course, it veries T  ^ and RT <
=
R.
This implies that the steady state ination level is low enough to let the
central bank behave passively, while the low steady state level of the
interest rate enables the scal authority to honor the entire sovereign
debt.
Starting from the steady state, the current equilibrium characterizing
a Tranquil Time is described by equations (16a) and (16b) on condition
that the economy were not hited by hard negative shocks. Then, if in
the next period scal shock is void, the economy returns to its steady
state.
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3.2 "Ination Times"
Compared to the previous case, these periods are characterized by both
higher current interest rates and ination levels. This is linked to the
fact that the economy is hit by harder negative scal shocks. The current
ination remains dened like in the previous case but it now exceeds the
ination threshold ^ and the central bank behaves actively by increasing
current interest rates:
It =
Rt 1
1 + t
> ^ (19a)
RIt = R + 

Rt 1
1 + t
  ^

<
=
R (19b)
where It denotes current ination rate during infaltion times and R
I
t
denotes the risky gross nominal interest rate paid by the scal authority
during ination times.
This equilibrium is satised on condition that It > ^ and R
I
t <
=
R
which implies:
(1 + t) R^ < Rt 1 < (1 + t)

R^ +  

(20a)
using again R^ =  1^;or, equivalently:
=
 (Rt 1) < t < ^ (Rt 1) (20b)
with
  
=
R  R

> 0 (21)
and where the function
=
 () is dened by:
=
 (R)  R
R^ +  
  1 < ^ (R) (22)
Condition (20b) expresses that a period of ination is driven by a
strictly negative shock which is no longer soft, given the level of Rt 1.
The shock is rather hard but not enough to drive the economy into
default.
The deterministic steady state is easily obtained by putting t = 0
and RIt = Rt 1 in equation (19a) and (19b). We obtain:
RI =
R^  R
   1 (23a)
I = RI =
^   
   1 (23b)
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This deterministic steady state equilibrium exists on condition that
RI <
=
R and I > ^ or, equivalently:
R^ < RI <
=
R
The left-hand side of the previous inequality is always veried under
Assumption 1, and the right-hand side requires the following condition:
Assumption 3:
=
R > R^ +

R^  R

= (   1)
Assumption 3 implies that
=
R must be high enough to satisfy RI <
=
R:
This condition is needed to ensure the existence of a deterministic steady
state under a period of ination.
The (partial) dynamics of these two scenarios is represented on Figure
1 in the case t = 0 :
1-tR
45°
Rˆ IR
ab·
·
R
R
tR
IR
R
G+Rˆ
Figure 1: The No-Default Case
It is worth noticing that, while RT = R is locally stable, given that
 > 1; RI is an unstable steady state equilibrium. This means that,
depending on the previous value of the nominal interest rate at the left
or at the right from RI the current interest rate will converge to R (if
t is void or small enough), or increase toward
=
R: Unless a big positive
scal shocks occurs, the latter scenario inevitably leads to a sovereign
default.
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In the scenario of "Ination Times", a previous value of the nom-
inal interest rate higher than RI cause the nancial wealth of private
agents to grow faster in nominal terms, which calls for higher ination.
Monetary authority responds to higher ination with su¢ ciently higher
nominal interest rates forming a vicious circle. Usually, hyperination is
interpreted as a result of the monetary nancing of serious scal imbal-
ances. However, in this case a scalist alternative is presented in which
ination explodes because of the scal e¤ects of monetary policy. Most
of the action concentrates on the interest rate pays on the government
debt and debt rollover instead of seigniorage. This phenomena is known
as scalist hyperinationand is the case of Brazil in the late 1970s and
early 1980s (See Loyo 1999).
3.3 "Sovereign Default Time"
According to the scal authority, the potential cost of servicing the whole
debt becomes too high when Rndt >
=
R which implies:
Rt 1 > (1 + t)

R^ +  

(24a)
or, equivalently,
t <
=
 (Rt 1) (24b)
This condition shows that for a given level of Rt 1; a scenario of
Default can be triggered by a hard negative shock or, for a given shock
t; by a high level of the previous nominal interest rate.
As a consequence, the scal authority defaults on its debt by honoring
only a fraction ht < 1 of its liabilities. From equations (14) and (6),
current ination and interest rate become:
Dt =ht
Rt 1
1 + t
(25a)
RDt =

ht
Rt 1
1 + t

(25b)
Note that without specifying the recovery rule ht = h(Rndt ) < 1 
the equilibrium in period t remains undetermined and dened by equa-
tion (25a) and (25b). There is a continuum of recovery rate determining
the equilibrium ination rate and so the nominal interest rate. This
result is in line with Buiters criticism.14 In order to avoid this indeter-
minacy the scal authority has to specify a recovery rule.
14See Buiter (1999), pp. 50, Proposition 5.
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Before introducing such a recovery rule, let us rewrite the system in a
simplied form, using (15a) equations (25a) and (25b) can be rewritten
as:
Dt =ht
nd
t = ht
 1  Rndt  (26a)
RDt =
 
ht
nd
t

= 
 
ht
 1  Rndt  (26b)
where the last terms have been obtained by inverting the monetary rule
(6).
We now can make the following assumption about the recovery func-
tion h(Rndt ) :
h(Rndt ) 
 R
 1
 
Rndt
 (27)
Equation (27) shows that the higher is Rndt , the potential cost of
honoring the entire debt, the smaller is the recovery rate. Using the
recovery function (27) and the monetary rule (6) in equations (26a) and
(26b), the equilibrium values of Dt and R
D
t become:
Dt = 
RDt =
R
Thus, the recovery rule (27) allows the economy, by defaulting on
its nancial obligations, to reach the stable steady state equilibrium15 in
the same period t. The equilibrium value of the recovery rate is:
ht =
(1 + t) R
Rt 1
(28)
4 Ination and Default Dynamics
This section illustrates the economy dynamics in two di¤erent cases of
default. In the rst one, the current scal shock is small but the initial
value of the nominal interest rate, R 1; is high. The economy jumps into
an ination episode which leads the central bank to rise its interest rate
and, after three periods, the scal authority to default. In the second
case, the initial interest rate is at its "Tranquil Times" stationary value:
R; but the economy experiences a big negative scal shock16 which leads
very rapidly to a sovereign default.
15Besides, this recovery rule minimizes the probability of default after the sovereign
default. See the next sections on Expected Recovery Rate and Sovereign Risk Spread.
16Figure 3 and especially 4 are only illustrative because we have to expect that a
negative shock - an innovation - has no reason to repeat.
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1-tR
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R
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R
)ˆ)(1( G++ RthR
45°
1-R
Figure 2: A small scal shock
1-tR
45°
Rt ˆ)1( h+
th
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+1
R
tR
R
)ˆ)(1( G++ RthR
Figure 3: A big negative scal shock
Deciding to default on the government liabilities is a di¢ cult decision
for policy makers. This may explain why, in the data, the actual value
of the interest rate
=
R is greater than what one might expect. This seems
to be the case of Argentina in 1989. At the end of 1989, the year in
which Argentina defaulted on its debt, the ination rate had reached
a shocking 4923,6%. Then Argentina had gradually converged to its
steady state equilibrium (See Table 1):
Table 1: Argentine Default, 1989
 expressed as a percentage
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Ination 81,9 174,8 387,7 4923,6 1343,9 84,0 17,5 7,4 3,9 1,6
Source: Indec
According to our model, the scal authority was both too tolerant
and patient, i.e.
=
R was too high. Moreover, Argentina in 1989 could
minimize the recovery rate on its debt in order to reach faster the (with-
out ination) steady state equilibrium. To explain the gradual decline
of ination, it is necessary to modify the recovery rule slightly. Suppose
that the rule is now dened by:
h(Rndt ) 
R
 1
 
Rndt
 (29)
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with R^ < R < RI :
The recovery rule (29) and the condition R^ < R < RI are well
specied in order to ensure a post-default equilibrium which drives pro-
gressively the economy to "Tranquil Times", on condition that future
scal shocks are small enough.
This case is represented on Figure 2.4:
1-tR
Rt ˆ)1( h+
th
ab
+1
R
tR
R
)ˆ)(1( G++ RthR
45°
1-R
*R
Figure 4: Argentinean soft-landing
This policy has the double advantage of reducing the size of the sov-
ereign default necessary to restore the public solvency and to smooth the
return toward price stability. On the other hand, this recovery rule does
not minimize the probability of a new default after the rst sovereign
default. For the sake of simplicity, we will adopt in the rest of the paper
the simpler assumption R = R:
5 Expected Recovery Rate and Sovereign Risk Pre-
mium
In this section, we make simplifying assumptions on the scal shock dis-
tribution and we show that, once the Fiscal Default Rule is known17, the
one-period Expected Recovery Rate, Etht+1; and the Relative Sovereign
Risk Premium,

Rt  Rft

=Rft ; can be explicitly calculated. Note that
the period-t probability of default in t+1 is simply given by: F

=
 (Rt)

:
The three scenarios previously described are summarized by the fol-
17Which is summarized by the choice of
=
R and R (= R in our case).
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lowing table:
Table 2: The Three Scenarios
Tranquil Times Ination Times Sovereign Default Time
^ (Rt 1) < t
=
 (Rt 1) < t < ^ (Rt 1) t <
=
 (Rt 1)
ht : 1 1 (1 + t)
R
Rt 1
t :
Rt 1
1+t
Rt 1
1+t

Rt : R R + 

Rt 1
1+t
  R^

R
The conditions that determine the current regime are entirely dened
by the couple of states variables (Rt 1; t) : Let F () denes the distri-
bution function of the scal shocks, and  > 0 and  , respectively,
the upper and lower bound of the compact set on which the shock is
distributed. The Figure 2.5 summarizes these conditions:
·
Inflation
Tranquil Times
Default
G+RˆRˆ
th
· 1-tR
)( 1-tRh
)(ˆ 1-tRh
-1
h
h
· ·
a b
Figure 5: The Regime Determination
Note that the period-t  1 probability of default in t is simply given
by: F

=
 (Rt 1)

; the probability of a "Tranquil Times" period by:
1   F (^ (Rt 1)), and the probability of an "Ination Times" episode
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by: F (^ (Rt 1))  F

=
 (RRt 1)

: Then, if Rt 1 < b; the ex ante prob-
ability of a sovereign default in period t is null and, when Rt 1 < a; the
probability of a "Tranquil Times" period equals unity.
5.1 Expected Recovery Rate
Using Table 1, the one-period Expected Recovery Rate can be written:
Etht+1=
Z =(Rt)
 
(1 + ) R
Rt
dF () +
Z 
=
(Rt)
1dF ()
= 1  Rt  
R
Rt
F

=
 (Rt)

+
R
Rt
Z =(Rt)
 
dF () (30)
Notice that the default probability, F

=
 (Rt)

; is strictly positive
(Resp. null) and that
R =(Rt)
  dF () is strictly negative (Resp. null)
if
=
 (Rt) >   (Resp. = (Rt)   ): One can conclude that the one-
period expected recovery rate veries: Etht+1 < 1 for
=
 (Rt) >   and
Etht+1 = 1 otherwise. Starting from the "Tranquil Times" steady state,
i.e. Rt = R; we have
=

 
R

=

R^ +
=
R  R

=
 1
R   1 < 0 and
(30) can be simplied as:
Etht+1 = 1 +
Z =( R)
 
dF ()
which then veries Etht+1 < 1 for
=

 
R

>   and Etht+1 = 1 otherwise.
5.2 Sovereign Risk Premium
From (8) and (9), the relative sovereign risk premium can be dened by:
Rt  Rft
Rft
=
 1
h
Et
ht+1
t+1
i 1
 1
h
Et
1
t+1
i 1   1 = Et 1t+1
Et
ht+1
t+1
  1
Using again the results in Table 1, this expression becomes:
Rt  Rft
Rft
=
R =(Rt)
 
 
 R
 1
dF () +
R 
=
(Rt)

Rt
1+
 1
dF ()R 
 

Rt
1+
 1
dF ()
  1
=
Z =(Rt)
 
Rt
R
dF () +
Z 
=
(Rt)
(1 + ) dF ()  1
=
Rt   R
R
F

=
 (Rt)

+
Z 
=
(Rt)
dF () (31)
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with
R 
=
(Rt)
dF () > 0 when
=
 (Rt) >   and
R 
=
(Rt)
dF () = 0 other-
wise. One concludes that the relative sovereign risk premium is strictly
positive for
=
 (Rt) >   and null otherwise. At the "Tranquil Times"
steady state, i.e. Rt = R; equation (31) simplies to:
R Rf
Rf
=
Z 
=
( R)
dF ()
which is strictly positive for   < =   R and null otherwise.
5.3 Calibration and Simulation
For sake of simplicity, we will assume that scal (relative) innovations
are uniformly distributed: F () = ( + ) =2: The one-period Expected
Recovery Rate is given by equation (30) which can be rewritten, for
  < = (Rt) <  :
Etht+1=
R
Rt
"
=
 (Rt) + 
2
+
1
2
 
=
 (Rt)
2   2
2
!#
+ 1 
=
 (Rt) + 
2
=1 
"
Rt   R
Rt
 
=
 (Rt) + 
2
!
+
R
Rt
 
2   = (Rt)2
4
!#
and the one-period Sovereign Risk Premium is:
Rt  Rft
Rft
=
Rt   R
R
 
=
 (Rt) + 
2
!
+
2   = (Rt)2
4
We can easily illustrate our results by adopting the following annual
calibration for the models parameters:
Table 2.3: Calibration
Denition Parameter Value
Discount factor:  0:95
Taylor coe¢ cient:  1:5
Interest rate target: R 1:05
Monetary threshold: R^ 1:10
Fiscal threshold:
=
R 1:50
Upper bound of the distribution function:  0:15
We can rstly calculate the lower threshold value of Rt for which
F

=
 (Rt)

 0: The solution is 1:177; which is superior to R = 1:05 (and
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even superior to R^ = 1:10): This implies that, starting from the "Tran-
quil Times" Steady State in period t; the probability for the Government
to default on its debt in t+1 is always null. After this calibration, a Sov-
ereign Default cannot be observed without a period of growing ination.
Consequently, an aggressive central bank ghting against ination does
not go without costs. It increases the scal burden of the government
debt as well as the sovereign risk of default. A higher current interest
rate increases the current probability of default which is captured by the
current sovereign risk premium.
The resulting values for the scal default threshold,
=
 (Rt) ; the de-
fault probability F

=
 (Rt)

; the Expected Recovery Rate, Etht+1; and
the one-period Sovereign Risk Premium

Rt  Rft

=Rft are represented
as functions of the current interest rate Rt
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Graph 1: Default Threshold Graph 2: Default Probability
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Graph 3: Expected Recovery Rate Graph 4: Relative Risk Premium
These Graphs show that when Rt  1:177; even the hardest the
negative scal shock say  =  0; 15 does not drive the economy into
default. Thus, the Probability of Default is null, the Expected Recovery
Rate is equal to one, and so the Relative Risk Premium is void. Oth-
erwise, when Rt > 1:177 there are (negative) values for the scal shock
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that might drive the economy into default. Thus, the Probability of De-
fault becomes positive, the Expected Recovery Rate becomes lower than
the unity, and the Relative Risk Premium positive. The higher is Rt; the
higher are both the Probability of Default and Relative Risk Premium
and the lower the Expected Recovery Rate.
This nding contrasts with that of Uribe (2006)s and is in line with
the empirical evidence and estimates presented on Andritsky (2005) and
Sosa Navarro (2005).
6 Further Research and Discussion
This section presents a work in progress. It provides interesting ndings
and contributes to the discussion over the monetary policy on ination
as well as sovereign default dynamics.
As before, assume that the monetary policy takes the form of an
interest-rate feedback rule whereby the short-term nominal interest rate
is set as a function of ination. But unlike the previous case, assume
that the interest rate controlled by the central bank is the risk-free nom-
inal interest rate, Rft = 1=EtQt;t+1; and not the interest rate paid on
government debt, Rt:
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Then, the central bank behavior can be expressed as,
Rft =  (t) =

R if t  ^
R +  (t   ^) otherwise with  >  1
(32)
where R =  1 is the stationary value of the gross nominal interest
rate associated to the ination target ; and ^ represents an ination
threshold. It will be useful to dene: R^ =  1^; about which we make
the same assumption as before: R^ > R; or, equivalently: ^ > :
Therefore, the equilibrium can be dened as:
Denition 2 A rational expectations competitive equilibrium is dened
as a set of processes
n
t; bt; Rt; R
f
t ; ht
o1
t=0
satisfying equations (8), (9),
(10), (11), the monetary rules (32), the debt recovery rule (7), and the
exogenous process for the primary surpluses f tg1t=0 where R 1b 1 are
given and the recovery rate satises ht 2 (0; 1) q
18This assumption seems to be more in accordance with the cashless economy
framework that we have chosen. Indeed, this framework does not explicitly take
into account the open market interventions by the central bank on the government
securities market and does not facilitate an explaination of the control of the interest
rate Rt by monetary authorities.
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6.1 The Three Scenarios for this Economy
The asymmetric form of both equations (32) and (7) may potentially
imply the existence of four regimes, but assumptions 1 and 2 permit to
exclude the case where the central bank naturally19 pegs the interest
rate to R; leading the scal authority to default on its outstanding debt.
Three scenarios are left.
Both "Tranquil Times" and "Ination Times" are characterized by
the absence of sovereign default. Then, the equilibrium level of ination
and interest rates are given by equations (14) and (32) with ht = 1 :
ndt =
Rt 1
1 + t
(33a)
Rft =
 
ndt

=

R if ndt  ^
R + 
 
ndt   ^

otherwise
(33b)
The third one is the scenario of Sovereign Default where ht < 1.
In this case, the scal authority nds that the potential cost of servicing
its whole debt is una¤ordable. Consequently, it defaults on its liabilities
by honoring only a fraction of its nancial obligations.
6.1.1 "Tranquil Times"
When the value of the ination rate (33a) satises the condition ndt  ^;
equation (33b) implies that the central bank pegs the risk-free interest
rate to R: Also, these periods are characterized by both low current
ination and interest rates. We have:
Tt =
Rt 1
1 + t
 ^ (34a)
Rf;Tt = R (34b)
where Rf;Tt denotes the current risk-free nominal interest rate in "Tran-
quil Times".
Both equations (34a) and (34b) are satised on condition that Tt  ^
which implies:
Rt 1  (1 + t) R^ (35a)
remembering that R^ =  1^;or, equivalently:
t  ^
 
Rt 1

(35b)
where ^ (R) is dened as:
^ (R)  R=R^  1 (36)
19By "naturally", we mean: "considering the ination rate which would be realized
in the case of No Default".
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6.1.2 "Ination Times"
Compared to the previous case, these periods are characterized by both
higher current interest rates and ination levels. And this is linked to
the fact that the economy is hit by harder negative scal shocks. The
current ination remains dened like in the previous case but now it
exceeds the ination threshold ^ and the central bank behaves actively
by increasing the current interest rate:
It =
Rt 1
1 + t
> ^ (37a)
Rf;It = R + 

Rt 1
1 + t
  ^

<
=
Rf (37b)
where Rf;It denotes the current risk-free nominal interest rate in "Ina-
tion Times".
This equilibrium is satised on condition that It > ^ and R
f;I
t <
=
Rf
which implies:
(1 + t) R^ < Rt 1 < (1 + t)

R^ +  

(38a)
using again R^ =  1^;or, equivalently:
=

 
Rt 1

< t < ^
 
Rt 1

(38b)
with
  
=
R  R

> 0 (39)
and where the function
=
 () is dened by:
=
 (R)  R
R^ +  
  1 < ^ (R) (40)
Condition (38b) expresses that a period of ination is driven by a
strictly negative shock which is no longer soft, given the level of Rt 1.
The shock is rather hard but not enough to drive the economy into
default.
6.1.3 "Sovereign Default Time"
According to the scal authority, the potential cost of servicing the whole
debt becomes too high when Rt >
=
R; i.e., Rft >
=
Rf which implies:
Rt 1 > (1 + t)

R^ +  

(41a)
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or, equivalently,
t <
=

 
Rt 1

(41b)
This condition shows that for a given shock t; a scenario of Default
can be triggered by a high level of the previous nominal interest rate or,
for a given level of Rt 1; by a hard negative scal shock.
As a consequence, the scal authority defaults on its debt by honoring
only a fraction ht < 1 of its liabilities. From equations (14) and (32),
current ination and risk free interest rates become:
Dt =ht
nd
t (42a)
Rf;Dt =
 
ht
nd
t

(42b)
where ndt is always dened by (33a) as the equilibrium ination rate in
the no default case.
Note that without specifying the recovery rule ht = h(ndt ) < 1 the
equilibrium in period t remains undetermined and dened by equation
(42a) and (42b).20 There is a continuum of recovery rate determining
the equilibrium ination rate and so the nominal interest rate. This
result is line with Buiters critic.21 In order to avoid this indeterminacy
the scal authority has to specify a recovery rule. We now can make the
following assumption about the recovery function h(ndt ) :
h(ndt ) 

ndt
(43)
where  veries:
Assumption 4:  < 

R^ +  

= ^ +

=
Rf   R

=:
Equation (43) shows that, for a given value of ; the higher is the
potential ination rate ndt , the smaller is the recovery rate. Using the
recovery function (43) and the monetary rule (32) in equations (42a)
and (42b), the equilibrium values of Dt and R
f;D
t become:
Dt =

Rf;Dt = (
)
20We suppose that such a rule is a (non increasing) function of the nominal interest
rate, denoted Rndt ; to be determined by the monetary authority in the No-Default
case. Then, Rndt = 
 
ndt

represents the potential cost of honoring the whole debt
in the future.
21See Buiter (1999), pp. 50, Proposition 5.
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Thus, the recovery rule (43) allows the economy, by defaulting on its
nancial obligations, to reach a less inationary equilibrium in the same
period t. Note that if   ^; the monetary rule (32) implies Rf;Dt = R:
Using (33a) in equation (43), the equilibrium value of the recovery
rate is:
ht =
(1 + t)

Rt 1
(44)
Assumption 4 ensures that this recovery rate is always inferior to
unity.
6.2 Expected Recovery Rate, Sovereign Risk Pre-
mium and Interest Rates
It is possible to express Rt as an invertible function of R
f
t ; and hence
=
Rf as a function of
=
R: Let Pt = Rt=Rft denotes the gross sovereign risk
premium. From (8) and (9), Pt can be dened by:
Pt = Rt
Rft
=
Et
1
t+1
Et
ht+1
t+1
(45)
Now lets make simplifying assumptions about the scal shock dis-
tribution and we will see that, once the Fiscal Default Rule is known -
which is summarized by the choice of
=
Rf and R the sovereign risk pre-
mium, Pt = Rt=Rft ; and the one-period expected recovery rate, Etht+1;
can be calculated. Let us begin by summarizing our results with the
following table:
Table 4: the three scenarios
Tranquil Times Ination Times Sovereign Default Time
^
 
Rt 1

< t
=

 
Rt 1

< t < ^
 
Rt 1

t <
=

 
Rt 1

ht : 1 1
(1+t)

Rt 1
t :
Rt 1
1+t
Rt 1
1+t

Rft : R R + 

Rt 1
1+t
  R^

 ()
where ^ (R) = R=R^   1 and = (R)  R=

R^ +
=
Rf  R


  1 and with
R < R^ <
=
Rf and  () <
=
Rf :
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6.2.1 Expected Recovery Rate
Using the results presented in the rst row of Table 1, the one-period
Expected Recovery Rate can be written:
Etht+1=
Z =(Rt)
 
(1 + )
Rt
dF () +
Z 
=
(Rt)
1dF ()
= 1 
Z =(Rt)
 

1  (1 + )

Rt

dF () (46)
where the last term after the sign of subtraction is positive under As-
sumption 4 for
=
 (Rt) >   and null otherwise.
One can conclude that the Expected Recovery Rate veries Etht+1 <
1 for
=
 (Rt) >   and Etht+1 = 1 otherwise. Identically, let us dene
R such that
=
 (R) =  : According to equation (38a), we have :
R = (1  ) (R +  )
and we know that Etht+1 < 1 if Rt > R:
6.2.2 Sovereign Risk Premium
Using now the second row of Table 4 and equation (45), the gross sov-
ereign risk premium - or country risk spread - Pt = Rt=Rft = Et 1t+1=Et (ht+1=t+1) ;
can be written:
Pt=
R =(Rt)
  (
) 1 dF () +
R 
=
(Rt)

Rt
1+
 1
dF ()R 
 

Rt
1+
 1
dF ()
= 1 +
Z =(Rt)
 

Rt

  (1 + )

dF ()  P (Rt) (47)
where the last term after the sign of addition is positive under Assump-
tion 4 for
=
 (Rt) >   and null otherwise . So, we can conclude that
Pt > 1 if Rt > R:
We can easily obtain the derivative of the function P (Rt) for Rt >
R :
P 0 (Rt) =


F

=
 (Rt)

+
0@ 

  1
R^ +  

1ARtF 0 = (Rt) > 0
where we have used equation (40) and (39). Assumption 4 insures that
this derivative is always positive.
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Using again the denition of the gross sovereign risk premium: Pt =
Rt=R
f
t and equation (47), one can establish a link between Rt and R
f
t :
Rft = G (Rt) 
Rt
P (Rt)
(48)
where the function G (Rt) has a derivative given by:
G0 (Rt) =
1
P (Rt)
  RtP
0 (Rt)
P (Rt)2
which veries: 0 < G0 (Rt) < 1 if Rt > R and G
0 (Rt) = 1 otherwise.
Equation (48) implicitly permits to determine the interest rate on
government securities as a function of the riskless interest rate set by
the central bank. By inverting the function G () ; one nds:
Rt = G
 1

Rft

 g

Rft

(49)
where the function g

Rft

veries: g0

Rft

= 1=G0

G 1

Rft

> 1 if
Rt > R and g
0

Rft

= 1 otherwise.
6.2.3 Riskless and Risky Interest Rates
Using nally the last row of Table.4 and equation (49), one can express
the risky sovereign debt interest rate:
Rt =
8>><>>:
g
 
R

if Rt 1 < (1 + t) R^
g

R + 

Rt 1
1+t
  R^

if (1 + t) R^ < Rt 1 < (1 + t)

R^ +  

g ( ()) if Rt 1 > (1 + t)

R^ +  

(50)
Let us dene Rf;I such that: Rf;I = g

R + 

Rf;I   R^

and
suppose that R^ < Rf;I < R^ +  : By evaluating the derivative @Rt=Rt 1
for Rt 1 = R
f;I when t = 0; we obtain:
@Rt
@Rt 1

Rt 1=Rf;I ;t=0
= g0
 
Rf;I

> 1
We now can represent Rft and Rt as function of Rt 1 in the case
t = 0 :
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1tR -
Rˆ
R
f
tR
R
G+RˆR
45°
( ))( *pfg
tR
I,fR
)( *pf
tR
f
tR
f
R
I,fR ab
hR
Note that the assumption  > 1 is su¢ cient but unnecessary to
guarantee g0
 
Rf;I

> 1:
Corollary 3 In presence of a default risk, the monetary policy can be
active even in the case  < 1:
7 Conclusion
The mail goal of this paper is to characterize the way in which monetary
policy a¤ects the equilibrium behavior of recovery rate and sovereign
risk premiums. This is an issue which has been fairly disregarded by
recent monetary theory. The framework of analysis proposed in this
paper o¤ers an additional perspective to discuss the possible interrela-
tions between monetary and scal policy and provides supplementary
advantages as regards other settings. It allows to overcome somes dif-
culties like the negative default rate which arises as a consequence of
positive scal shocks recall the super-solvency premiumin terms of
Buiter. This model characterizes the way in which monetary policy af-
fects the equilibrium behavior of price level, recovery rate and sovereign
risk premiums. Indeed, in some cases, even a passiveinterest rate rule
might drive the economy to an unsustanable path without defaulting.
It means that in presence of a default risk, the monetary policy can be
active even in the case where  < 1:It turns out that monetary policy
plays a signicant role in shaping the equilibrium behavior of default and
risk premiums. Both the Probability of Default and Sovereign Risk Pre-
mium are consistent with the empirical estimates presented in Andritsky
(2005) and Sosa Navarro (2005).
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It also underlines the fact that the size of the equilibrium default rate
matters for the post-equilibrium dynamics. The size of the equilibrium
default rate cannot be so high in order to ensure a post-equilibrium
dynamics without defaulting. The model explicitly emphasizes the role
of the government (the scal authority) in resolving the nancial crisis.
Even though the current framework can be extended in di¤erent di-
rections, these have been left aside to simplify the exposition. For in-
stance, it can be assumed that a fraction of the public debt is indexed.
High ination economies tend to develop an extensive system of indexed
contracts. It is worth noticing that bonds linked to price indices are not
realbonds because sampling and computing price indices involve time.
The nominal value of indexed bonds is typically adjusted according to
lagged ination rates. Othewise, it coud be assumed that public debt is
denominated in foreign currency. These are important characteristics of
actual emerging economies that would be worthwhile incorporating.
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8 Appendix
Multiplying both sides of equation (5) byRtht+1 asBtRtht+1 = Bt 1Rt 1htRtht+1 
 tPtRtht+1. Then, iterating the last expression j times, it results in:
Rt+jBt+jht+j+1 = Rt 1Bt 1ht

jQ
h=0
Rt+hht+h+1

(51)
 
jX
h=0
Pt+h t+h

jQ
k=h
Rt+kht+k+1

Dividing both sides of equation (51) by Pt+j+1 see that Pt+j+1 can
also be written as Pt+j+1 = Pt
Pt+1
Pt
Pt+2
Pt+1
:::
Pt+j
Pt+j 1
Pt+j+1
Pt+j
it turns out that,
Rt+jBt+j
Pt+j+1
ht+j+1 =
Rt 1Bt 1
Pt
ht

jQ
h=0
Rt+hht+h+1
Pt+h
Pt+h+1

(52)
 
jX
h=0
 t+h

jQ
k=h
Rt+kht+k+1
Pt+k
Pt+k+1

Applying the conditional expectations operator Et; equation (52) be-
comes written,
Et
Rt+jBt+j
Pt+j+1
ht+j+1 =
Rt 1Bt 1
Pt
htEt

jQ
h=0
Rt+hht+h+1
Pt+h
Pt+h+1

(53)
  Et
jX
h=0
 t+h

jQ
k=h
Rt+kht+k+1
Pt+k
Pt+k+1

Next, by applying the law of iterated expectations and using equation
(9) equation (53) remains expressed as,
Et
Rt+jBt+j
Pt+j+1
ht+j+1= 
 j 1Rt 1Bt 1
Pt
ht (54)
 
jX
h=0
 (j h+1)Et t+h
Dividing both sides of equation (54) by  j and then taking the limit
for j !1, it turns out,
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lim
j!1
jEt
Rt+jBt+j
Pt+j+1
ht+j+1= 
 1Rt 1Bt 1
Pt
ht (55)
 
1X
h=0
h 1Et t+h
See that dening T = t+j+1, the left hand-side of equation (55) can
be expressed as lim
T!1
T j 1Et
RT 1BT 1
PT 1
hT = 0. Then, multiplying this
expression by ; it remains expressed as equation (10) which is equal to
zero. So equation (55) results in,
Rt 1Bt 1
Pt
ht =
1X
h=0
hEt t+h 8t
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